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TITLE: The Crime Drop and the Security Hypothesis 
 
 
Abstract 
Major crime drops were experienced in the United States and most other 
industrialised countries for a decade from the early to mid-1990s. Yet there is little 
agreement over explanation or lessons for policy. Here it is proposed that change in 
the quantity and quality of security was a key driver of the crime drop. From evidence 
relating to vehicle theft in two countries it is concluded that electronic immobilisers 
and central locking were particularly effective. It is suggested that reduced car theft 
may have induced drops in other crime including violence. From this platform a 
broader security hypothesis, linked to routine activity and opportunity theory, is 
outlined.   
 
 
Introduction 
From the early to mid-1990s many industrialised countries experienced major falls in 
crime. They occurred first in the United States where serious violent crime including 
homicide fell by 40 percent. This received a great deal of media attention and remains 
a focus for much of the academic research. Yet other street crimes also fell 
dramatically in the US, while crime reductions of similar magnitude occurred in many 
other industrialised countries. With variation by country and crime type there were 
significant declines in crime across the European countries for which reliable 
comparison could be made using the International Crime Victims Survey (van Dijk et 
al. 2007, van Dijk, 2006a, 2006b). In England and Wales, violent crime fell 49 
percent, burglary 59 percent and vehicle theft 65 percent between 1995 and 2007 
(Hoare, 2009; 21). Significant falls in crime have been identified in other countries 
including Australia, Canada and Japan and elsewhere (see e.g. Zimring, 2007; 
Rosenfeld, 2009; Rosenfeld and Messner, forthcoming; Tseloni et al., forthcoming).  
 
There is a now maturing body of work seeking to explain the drop in violence in the 
United States. Blumstein and Wallman (2000, 2006), for example, offered a landmark 
collection of studies complementing the overview by LaFree (1999). Reviewing the 
literature on the factors causing the violent crime drop in 2004, Levitt concluded, 
however, that, 
 
“Most … actually played little direct role in the crime decline, including the 
strong economy of the 1990s, changing demographics, better policing 
strategies, gun control laws, concealed weapons laws, and increased use of the 
death penalty. Four factors, however, can account for virtually all of the 
observed decline in crime: increases in the number of police, the rising prison 
population, the waning crack epidemic and the legalization of abortion”. 
(Levitt, 2004; 163-4).   
 
Levitt himself had previously argued (Donohue and Levitt, 2001) that the legalization 
of abortion in the early 1970s meant that, by the 1990s, there were fewer youth in the 
groups most at-risk of committing crime. Yet Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) in a 
more recent review conclude this had only a small effect on crime. They cited studies 
which found that indicators such as school performance and labour force 
participation, which might also be expected to be affected by abortion, did not show 
any similar effects.  
 Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) found little support for the hypothesis that the lead-
free gasoline introduced in the 1970s reduced lead levels in brains and that this in turn 
induced less violence in adulthood. They conclude that any effect may be confounded 
with demographic change, noting “the arrival and waning of the baby boom 
generation from the high crime ages – coincided roughly with the arrival and 
departure of leaded gasoline” (p.27). Their main conclusion about the cause of the fall 
in violent crime in the US is that while increased imprisonment and increased police 
numbers may have played some role, changes in the crack cocaine market were the 
key. Youths wanted to avoid the mistakes and consequences of gun violence 
experienced by the early-80s cohort, and so reduced their gun usage and serious 
violence accordingly.  
 
Increased levels of police staffing and of imprisonment, while having political 
momentum and some inverse correlation with crime in the US context, do not appear 
to be relevant as explanatory factors elsewhere. Van Dijk and colleagues wrote in 
relation to imprisonment that:  
 
“Prison populations have since the early nineties gone up in many EU 
countries but not consistently so. Between 1995 and 2000 rates went down, for 
example, in Sweden, France, Poland and Finland (European Sourcebook, 
2003). Sentencing policies in Europe as a whole are considerably less punitive 
than in the USA (Farrington, Langan, and Tonry, 2004) and yet crime is 
falling just as steeply in Europe as it is in the USA. No relationship between 
the severity of sentencing of countries and trends in national levels of crime is 
therefore in evidence.” (van Dijk et al. 2007; 23).  
 
Rosenfeld and Messner (forthcoming) compare imprisonment rates in Europe and the 
US relative to burglary rates and, in keeping with van Dijk et al.’s suggestion, find no 
significant relationship. Rosenfeld and Messner found, however, that burglary tracked 
changes in consumer confidence both for the US and a set of European countries. 
They hypothesise that economic upturns reduce acquisitive crime because consumers 
turn less often to second-hand goods markets which are fed, at least in part, by stolen 
goods. Conversely in recession, demand for second-hand and stolen goods increases 
and drives acquisitive crime upwards. Rosenfeld (2009) proposes that growth in 
acquisitive crime in turn leads more people to adopt risky lifestyles and that this 
indirectly increases violent crime. Overall, therefore, Rosenfeld and his colleagues 
conclude a negative correlation between consumer confidence and crime is causally 
connected via the demand for stolen goods. We remain uncertain how this hypothesis 
reconciles with the improving economies and increasing crime rates of the second half 
of the twentieth century, and the hypothesis appears largely untested in the absence of 
evidence relating to stolen goods. To the present authors it also seems that violent 
crime in the US tracks motor vehicle theft rather better than it does an aggregate set of 
acquisitive crimes, and that this may turn out causally to be more important. 
 
The need for further research 
The present authors tend to agree with Blumstein and Rosenfeld, and with Levitt, that 
there is little evidence that demographic change, better policing, gun control, 
concealed weapons laws, or the death penalty can account for the widely-observed 
crime drops. We also concur with Blumstein and Rosenfeld’s review of work finding 
little support for the abortion hypothesis or the childhood-lead hypothesis. At the 
same time, there seems no reason to disagree with Levitt’s finding that the economy 
was not a major determinant, or with van Dijk et al.’s. suggestion and Rosenfeld and 
Messner’s finding that imprisonment cannot explain crime drops across countries. 
This cross-national comparative argument can be extended to suggest that change in 
street crack cocaine markets is unlikely to have been a significant factor outside of the 
US where such crack markets were never nearly as prominent, which in turn may cast 
further doubt on its validity in the US context.  
 
Although the various crime drop hypotheses would appear to have largely cancelled 
each other out by the time we enter the fray, some further comment is warranted. The 
tendency of much previous research to focus on violence means that acquisitive 
crimes that fell dramatically have received comparatively little attention. In addition, 
many single-factor explanations, particularly those that are offender-based, fail what 
we term the ‘phone theft test’. That is, they cannot explain why many crime types fell 
in the 1990s while others including phone theft and e-crimes increased. If there are 
fewer likely offenders as suggested by, inter alia, the abortion hypothesis and the 
childhood lead hypothesis, then why would some types of robbery, theft and fraud 
increase while others decreased? Explanations that look primarily at the number or 
motivation of likely offenders seem insufficiently nuanced to offer an explanation. 
We would suggest that technological progress brought new criminal opportunities that 
caused increases in phone theft, e-crime, and other new-technology crimes. This 
opportunity-theory explanation is compatible with the security hypothesis outlined 
below wherein opportunity was reduced concurrently for other crime types.  
 
 
The Security Hypothesis 
In relation to the cross-national nature of the crime drop, Clarke and Newman (2006) 
suggest:  
 
“In fact, the one thing in common amongst all these countries, including the 
United States, is that they have all made a huge investment in security during 
the past 25 years, affecting almost every aspect of everyday life.” (Clarke and 
Newman, 2006; 220).  
 
Clarke and Newman provide a list of security-related developments in an insightful 
short section of a book on preventing terrorism. Van Dijk (2006) proposed security as 
the cause of the crime drops and re-stated it later when reviewing other explanations 
and some preliminary evidence:  
 
“Perhaps a more significant factor inhibiting crime across the Western world is 
the universal growth in the possession and use of private security measures by 
households and companies over the past few decades. ICVS-based trend data 
on the use of precautionary measures confirm that in all Western countries, 
without exception, the use of measures to prevent property crimes such as car 
thefts and household burglaries has risen drastically over the past 15 years”. 
(van Dijk et al., 2007; 23) 
 
The present work draws upon that of Clarke and Newman, van Dijk, and others 
including Felson’s (1998) insights from a routine activity perspective. It is proposed 
that changes in the quantity and quality of security have played a major part in driving 
crime falls in most industrial societies. More specifically: 
 
1. Security improvements, including specific security devices, vary for different 
crimes but have been widely implemented. 
2. Different security measures work in different ways to reduce the crimes to 
which they are applied: they increase actual or perceived risk to the offender; 
and/or they reduce actual or perceived reward for the offender; and/or they 
increase actual or perceived effort for the offender. 
3. The different ways in which security measures work produce variations in 
expected changes in crime patterns associated with crime drops. These 
comprise expected security device crime change ‘signatures’. 
4. The specific falls in crime produced by improvements in security alongside 
their associated diffusions of benefit (preventive effects spilling out beyond 
the operational range of measures) to other targets and methods of committing 
crime are not matched by equivalent displacement. 
 
The following section presents case studies of the security hypothesis. Motor vehicle 
theft fell 60 percent in the United States in the decade from 1991. Beginning two 
years later, a distinctly similar drop occurred in England and Wales. From 2001, 
motor vehicle theft in Australia likewise plummeted and had fallen 55 percent by 
2007. These trends are shown in Figure 1, and prior to this each country had a long-
term upward trend. Data for the US are from the National Crime Victimization 
Survey, and those for England and Wales and Australia are police recorded crimes. 
Recorded crime data are a reliable indicator for motor vehicle theft due to its high 
level of reporting because of insurance requirements, and the England and Wales 
findings are corroborated by the British Crime Survey (Walker et al. 2006).   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In what follows, a series of analyses are presented that, it is concluded, indicate the 
reductions in motor vehicle theft in England and Wales and Australia were due to 
more and better vehicle security, particularly electronic immobilisers and central 
locking systems. It is then suggested that there is no reason to suppose another 
explanation underpinned the drop in the US. Following that, the security hypothesis is 
extended to suggest broader implications for other crime types including the drop in 
violent crime in the US.  
 
The security hypothesis applied to vehicle theft 
Four commonly used vehicle security devices are examined here: mechanical and 
electronic immobilizers, alarms and central locking. The working hypothesis is that 
immobilizers have greater impact on theft of than theft from cars (immobilizers do not 
make it harder to steal from cars), that alarms impact on theft from cars rather than 
theft of cars (alarms do not make it harder to drive cars away), and that central locking 
affects both but has a distinct impact on modus operandi (cars with central locking 
can still be entered in other ways). Whilst the security of the vehicle itself is the focus 
of this paper, the security of the environment in which the vehicle is parked is also 
relevant to its vulnerability (Mayhew and Braun 2004; Webb 2005), but changes in 
this are not considered here. Likewise, while there is a long history of car security 
improvements (Newman, 2004) with some partial successes such as steering-wheel 
locks (Mayhew et al., 1976; Webb, 1997), it is our contention that more recent 
devices, particularly the combination of good quality central-deadlocks, electronic 
immobilisers and alarms, have had far greater success.  
 
The data for England and Wales are from The British Crime Survey (BCS) which is a 
nationally representative survey conducted in 1982, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1998, 
and annually since 2000. The BCS collects information on crime experiences 
including vehicle crime – attempted and actual theft of vehicles, theft from vehicles, 
and vandalism of vehicles. It collects information on the security features of the 
vehicles targeted in the crime, and a separate module of the BCS asks a sub-set of 
respondents about the security of the main vehicle in a household. The data drawn on 
for Australia are from The Comprehensive Autotheft Research System (CARS) 
database, held by the National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council (NMVTRC). 
It contains police recorded crime data from 1997 onwards for the state of South 
Australia and from 2000 onwards for all Australian states. The data incorporate cars, 
buses, trucks and vans, but not motorcycles.  
 
In what follows, rather than present two separate country-level ‘stories’, a series of 
data vignettes, paired by country where possible, examines the mechanisms 
underpinning the reductions in car theft. Triangulation is the overarching approach, 
examining the crime falls, their timing and trajectories from various theoretical and 
empirical coordinates.  
 
 Trends in vehicle security 
The changing prevalence of security devices fitted to cars in England and Wales since 
1991 is shown in Figure 2. Close to 90 per cent of cars had central locking in 2006-7 
compared to 35 per cent in 1991. Over 60 per cent had alarms in 2006-7 compared to 
23 per cent in 1991. In 1999, 45 per cent of cars had an electronic immobilizer, rising 
to over two-thirds (69%) by 2006-7, although over the same period the proportion of 
cars with mechanical immobilizers declined from 40 to 33 per cent. Simple visual 
extrapolation of the trend in electronic immobilizers suggests they attained 
prominence somewhat later than alarms and central locking but then increased in 
prevalence more rapidly. By 2006-7 cars were more than twice as likely on average to 
have an electronic as opposed to mechanical immobilizer. Overall, the rate of vehicle 
theft in England and Wales declined as the prevalence of vehicle security increased. 
This crude correlation requires further examination via additional indicators to 
explore the possibility of causation.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Information on the implementation of vehicle security in Australia was qualitatively 
different and focused on immobilizers. A strength of the information is that it allows 
an examination of incremental change in the prescription of security by national 
security standards. This information provides valuable insight into the role of the 
quality rather than solely the prevalence of security. Devices such as immobilizers 
vary in specification and quality. Of particular note is that it was in 2001 that the good 
quality Australian Standard immobilizer was required to be fitted to all new vehicles 
nationally, and concerted effort made to encourage widespread retro-fitting of 
immobilisers. The detailed specifications that underpin good quality security should 
not be under-estimated, and it is only for clarity in the main text that a summary of 
key details of the Australian standard are relegated to Appendix 1. The proportion of 
vehicles with such immobilizers rose sharply from a quarter (27.4%) in 2000 to two-
thirds (64.7%) by 2004 (Kriven and Ziersch, 2007; 115).  
 
From 1997, the provincial government of Western Australia introduced subsidies for 
car owners to encourage electronic immobilisers. Minimum standard immobilizers 
were then mandated in Western Australia in 1999 (Forbes, 2000). This facilitates the 
construction of a natural experiment. Trends in vehicle theft in Western Australia and 
the remainder of Australia from 1997 to 2007 are shown in Figure 3. Data were only 
available from the second half of 1997 and so are presented in six-monthly units 
labelled as ‘a’ and ‘b’ for each year. Drop lines show that Western Australia made 
minimum standard immobilisers for vehicles mandatory before the rest of the country.  
It can be seen that this, together presumably with the effect of earlier subsidies and 
perhaps some anticipatory action in advance (see Smith et al 2002 on ‘anticipatory 
benefits’), was associated with the onset of a steady decline in car thefts in Western 
Australia.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
 
Permanent and temporary thefts 
Our working hypothesis would suggest that improved security in general and 
immobilizers in particular tend to reduce temporary theft (for joyriding, theft for 
transportation) more than permanent theft (for re-sale or breaking for parts). 
 
Figure 4a shows the falls in temporary and permanent theft of vehicles in England and 
Wales from 1995 to 2006/7. Two thirds of the drop is accounted for by a fall in 
temporary theft where cars were recovered. That is, the decline was disproportionately 
in joyriding and theft for transportation such as taking a car to get home at night, 
which declined by three-quarters. Such opportunistic and amateur car thieves would 
be less able or motivated to break into cars and drive them away when faced with 
better locks and/or immobilizers. Hence this signature is consistent with an 
explanation that electronic immobilizers and central locking were the cause of the 
drop in car theft. It is also noteworthy that permanent theft, presumably for parts or re-
sale, also experienced a decline of over 50 percent.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4a AND b ABOUT HERE 
 
In Australia, shown in Figure 4b, the temporary/permanent theft signature is 
uncannily similar to that identified for England and Wales. The timing of the fall in 
theft was several years later but appropriately coincides with the later introduction of 
immobilisers. As in England and Wales, the fall in vehicle thefts was 
disproportionately in recovered cars which fell by 60.1 per cent rather than 
unrecovered vehicles which fell by only 15.3 per cent.  
 
The greater fall in temporary as against permanent thefts of vehicles in both locations 
is consistent with immobilizers having greater impact upon more opportunistic thefts, 
with thefts for re-sale or parts still being reduced but proving more resistant (perhaps 
due to some displacement or due to efforts to overcome immobilizers). However the 
fact that there were falls also in numbers of permanent thefts suggests that even so-
called professional car thieves can be stopped by designing-out crime efforts. 
 
Rick Brown and colleagues (Brown and Thomas, 2003, Brown, 2004; see also Webb, 
2005) developed the temporary/permanent theft indicator of the differential effect of 
security upon car theft. They also suggested that there had been a shift towards the 
theft of older vehicles as a result of improvements in security to newer ones, and this 
is the indicator that follows.  
 
The age of stolen vehicles 
The working hypothesis would suggest that, if recent security is effective, the average 
age of stolen cars will have increased. That is,  as newer cars become harder to steal, 
the average age of stolen cars will increase. This was an element of the analysis by 
Kriven and Ziersch (2007) who tracked the age of vehicles stolen in Australia 
between 2000 and 2004. We were able to include an additional three years of data, up 
to 2007. . Our analysis, as with that of Kriven and Ziersch, found that amidst the 
overall reduction in thefts there has been a general increase in the age of stolen 
vehicles. However this is not an entirely unambiguous indicator because the impact of 
mandatory immobilizers (fitted to vehicles manufactured since 2001) would, by 2007, 
be expected primarily for vehicles aged six years or less. The more general ageing of 
stolen vehicles between 2000 and 2007 could reflect voluntary immobilisation by 
manufacturers and the retro-fitting of immobilizers on newer vehicles, as well as more 
general improvements in vehicle security that are more prevalent in newer than older 
vehicles. The BCS does not gather information on the age of stolen vehicles and so 
this indicator was not developed for England and Wales.  
 
 
Modus operandi 
The working hypothesis suggests that better locks cause a change in entry method 
from door forcing to window breaking. Likewise, it has been suggested that theft of 
keys may increase when it is otherwise too difficult to break into a car (Brown 2004)). 
This would comprise what is generally referred to as tactical displacement (Reppetto 
1976). 
 
Successive sweeps of the BCS suggest that the bulk of the decline in theft of cars in 
England and Wales was accounted for by a decline in the forcing of door locks. Other 
entry methods declined but to a lesser extent (see Figure 5a). This signature is 
consistent with central locking as the cause of the decline because better locks would 
reduce door-forcing more than window-breaking. There is, though, no evidence that 
tactical displacement to use of keys has been a prominent feature in vehicle theft 
trends. As part of the general decline, the number of thefts using keys fell 46.8 per 
cent from 1993 to 2006/7 while window-breaking fell 46.1 per cent. However, there 
was no change in thefts where the door was already unlocked which was around 18 
thousand in both 1993 and 2006-7. The proportional increase in other entry methods 
in Figure 5a reflects primarily the dramatic decline in locks being forced: The 
proportion of entries where windows were broken went from 13 per cent to 20 per 
cent, use of keys went from 9 per cent to 15 per cent, and thefts where the door was 
unlocked increased from 3 per cent to 10 per cent.  
 
INSERT FIGURE5a AND 5b ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
For attempts in England and Wales, lock-forcing decreased at the same time that 
window-breaking and other entry methods increased. This is consistent with stronger 
locks causing a shift to other entry methods, with completion of the endeavour then 
thwarted by an immobilizer (Table 1).  
 
The Australian police data on recorded vehicle thefts contained method of entry 
information for recovered vehicles. Figure 5b shows indexed trends in the main entry 
methods for recovered vehicles stolen after 20011. While all methods have declined, 
that of lock-forcing is most pronounced (a 68.3% drop), followed by reductions in 
window-breaking (a 58.0% drop) and entry to unlocked vehicles (a 54% drop). The 
decline was least pronounced in the use of keys which experienced only a 29.7 per 
cent drop. These findings suggest improvements in central locking may have 
complemented the use of immobilizers in generating the overall decrease in car theft. 
The findings correspond extremely well with those from England and Wales.  
 
Types of crime risk 
The working hypothesis would suggest that different security devices impact 
differentially by crime type: immobilizers reduce most the risk of theft of cars; alarms 
reduce most the risk of theft from cars, and central locking will reduce the risk of both 
theft of and theft from cars. The survey of England and Wales allowed further 
examination of this issue. By 2006-7, central locking was the most prevalent car 
security device. This is shown in the top left numeric cell of Table 2 where 87.8 per 
cent of all cars have central locking. The security devices shown in Table 2 are ranked 
by prevalence among all cars. Hence 62.9 per cent had alarms, with the least prevalent 
security device being tracking devices in 3.4 per cent of cars. Note that cars with 
electronic immobilizers are shown separately from cars with mechanical immobilizers 
but that 22.8 per cent of cars had both. Many cars will have multiple security devices 
in different combinations. One would expect a greater likelihood that cars with 
tracking devices also have central locking, an alarm and an electronic immobilizer. It 
can reasonably be inferred from the trajectory of implementation rates that cars with 
electronic immobilizer also have central locking and an alarm, but that central locking 
and alarms were also installed without electronic immobilizers. The other columns in 
Table 2 show the prevalence of the security devices among cars that experience crime. 
Hence 59.5 per cent of stolen cars had central locking and 41.2 per cent had an alarm, 
through to 0.8 per cent having a tracking device installed. The third and fourth 
columns show the prevalence of security devices among cars which experienced theft 
from the car and attempted theft respectively.  
 
                                                 
1  ‘Jemmied’ locks were excluded from the chart due to low numbers and high variability. In any year 
they accounted for only between 1 and 4 percent of entries with no consistent trend.  
Comparing the prevalence of security devices in all cars to that of victimized cars 
allows us to gauge the relative protective effects. If 87.8 per cent of cars have central 
locking then, ceteris paribus, one would expect 87.8 per cent of stolen cars to also 
have central locking if the central locking itself made no difference. The fact that only 
59.5 per cent of stolen cars had central locking suggests that cars with central locking 
were less likely to be stolen. In fact they were 34.5 per cent less likely to be stolen 
(that is, 59.5% is 65.5% of 87.8%, or 34.5% less), which is our measure of the 
protective effect.  
 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The protective effect is shown for each security device in Table 3, ranked by impact 
upon car theft, the first data column. Only 3.4 per cent of cars had tracking devices, 
but tracking devices had the greatest impact according to this indicator, reducing risk 
by 77.3 per cent, a finding that squares with that of Ayres and Levitt (1998). The 
second most effective device by this indicator is electronic immobilizers which 
reduced risk of car theft by 48.4 per cent. Not surprisingly, if a vehicle had both an 
electronic and mechanical immobilizer, the risk reduction effect was similar at 45.8 
per cent. However, mechanical immobilizers were the least effective device for 
reducing theft of cars with only 7.3 per cent less observed than expected thefts. The 
performance of window security etching was relatively poor by this measure and 
reduced risk of car theft by only 13.8 per cent.  
 
Confirmatory evidence of the validity of the indicator of protection is provided by the 
findings relating to theft from cars and attempted thefts. Electronic immobilizers have 
less effect upon theft from vehicles or attempts, and presumably that is artificially 
high due to the overlap with alarms. Car alarms, in contrast, confer a similar level of 
protection against both theft of and theft from a car. This finding fits well with the 
way in which alarms work – producing a more general deterrent against both theft of 
cars and theft from cars.  
 
Electronic immobilizers are a third again (32.7%) more effective in reducing car theft 
than alarms and 42.2 per cent more effective than central locking. All of these are 
many more times more effective than mechanical immobilisers or window security 
etching in reducing car theft. Tracking devices appear effective against theft of cars 
but not theft from cars or attempts, as might be expected, but had been fitted to 
relatively few vehicles.  
 
Ideally, we would be able to distinguish the pure effects of individual security devices 
but also their interaction effects, and this is a potential area for future research. 
Nevertheless, not only are the protective effects distinguishable for each device, but 
the variations across crime type and device accord with theoretical expectations. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Triangulation can be a powerful means of evaluation. With, say, only one dataset and 
only one data signature, few readers would be convinced that security caused the fall 
in car theft. After all, if crime falls fairly consistently for a decade there would be 
expected to be many correlates. However, with multiple data signatures of different 
types and approach, from different data sources in two countries, each signifying 
crime falls of similar magnitude but with distinct timings and characteristics that 
concord with their expected mechanisms of operation, the case is far stronger. That is, 
the likelihood that the findings are spurious or that there is a major plausible 
alternative hypothesis, now appears low.  
 
Analysis of data for other countries with and without drops in car theft would be 
needed more unequivocally to confirm the security hypothesis. It is our hope that the 
present work stimulates some replication and attempts at falsification. We conclude 
that the evidence presented here is sufficient that the burden is now on anyone 
challenging the specific security hypothesis relating to car crime reduction to provide 
counter-evidence or more compelling evidence for an alternative explanation.  
 
Extending the security hypothesis 
Whether or not the security hypothesis can be extended to other crime types is a 
different question. Clearly the case is not established here, though Clarke and 
Newman (2006) provided a long list of security tactics that could have reduced many 
different types of crime and which warrant further investigation. The present study 
gives cause for speculation about the falls in other crime types where we anticipate 
the mechanism of change is necessarily different. In so doing we also extend the 
security hypothesis so that it is a general hypothesis, based within a routine activity 
framework, and within which nestle a range of inter-locking and specific hypotheses. 
The first point of note, however, is that further specific security hypotheses warrant 
development and exploration in relation to other crime types including burglary, 
robbery, theft and violence.  
 
Burglary and car crime are debut crimes (Svensson, 2002) that novices commit as a 
low rung on the offending ladder. The present authors suspect that security played a 
significant role in burglary reductions that were evident in many industrialised 
countries, perhaps combined with changes in the value and availability of goods likely 
to be stolen. If these crimes are more difficult or less tempting to commit then perhaps 
novices do not progress to other crime types. Measures of the prevalence and 
frequency of offending would be appropriate to develop relevant indicators. This is 
here termed the debut crime hypothesis.  
 
A further conjecture relates to the role of car crime in particular as a facilitator of 
other crime types. Stolen cars make offenders more mobile, less constrained by public 
transport’s times and routes. They are used in burglaries to transport stolen goods, to 
drive to drug markets to make a purchase, for drive-by shootings and other crimes. 
Likewise, when offenders cannot commit burglary they do not go to fences, do not 
have cash to buy drugs, and do not interact with other offenders to the same extent in 
other contexts. Hence car crime (and potentially burglary) may be ‘keystone’ crimes 
which facilitate and encourage other crime types. Their prevention may have a knock-
on effect to other crime types in a manner akin to a diffusion of benefits (Clarke and 
Weisburd, 1994). This is here termed the keystone crime hypothesis.  
 
Lifestyle and routine activity theories, which link to the security hypothesis via their 
influence on criminal opportunities, warrant further exploration in relation to the 
crime drops. The rise of the Internet roughly coincided with the crime drops, but 
whether or not this is a coincidence remains to be seen. Perhaps the huge criminal 
opportunities presented by the Internet sucked some offenders away from traditional 
street crimes into online offending that is less routinely or easily recorded. The 
deterrent effect of a perceived increase in risk due to new forensic techniques, widely 
promoted in the media, may also need to be considered: Perhaps there was increased 
uncertainty, and hence honesty, among offenders, even if actual risk of detection 
increased only marginally. What about other changes in technology and lifestyles? 
Portable telephones allow potential victims and passersby to mobilise guardianship far 
more efficiently, for example, while integrated cameras and video threaten digitised 
proof of any offender’s identity. There are almost certainly many other routine 
activity-related changes that warrant attention, as Felson (1998) noted a decade ago, 
although his comments on these do not appear to have been taken up.  
 
In short, the overall security hypothesis incorporates a set of specific conjectures that 
are linked to routine activity and opportunity theory. We propose that the security 
hypothesis offers the best chance of generating useful information from the crime 
drops. Hence the reader should not be misled by the parsimonious name we offer for 
the set of hypotheses. However, at this early stage of the necessary research we 
acknowledge that additional country-level studies are likely to produce diverse 
findings. We suspect that Canada, for example, may provide evidence in support of a 
securitization hypothesis but not the debut crime hypothesis. Some crimes in Canada 
fell from the mid-1990s but car theft remained fairly stable, appearing to fall only 
after electronic immobilisers were promoted in more recent years (Tilley et al. 2009).  
 
 
Implications for the United States 
As observed earlier (Figure 1), motor vehicle theft in the United States dropped by 60 
percent in the 1990s. The fall began about two years before that in the UK and a 
decade before that in Australia. Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) observed that motor 
vehicle theft trends were similar to those of serious violence but not burglary:  
 
“The trend in motor vehicle theft, with a turning point in the early 1990s, is 
more similar to those for robbery and homicide than to the burglary trend, and 
it is consistent with qualitative accounts of stolen cars traded for drugs during 
the crack era (Jacobs, 1999) or for use by drug dealers to avoid having their 
own cars confiscated as forfeited assets. A clear need exists for research on the 
divergence between burglary and motor vehicle theft trends over the past 25 
years.” (Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008; 19).  
 
Our conjecture is that the 60 per cent drop in US car theft in the 1990s was a result of 
improved car security, particularly electronic immobilisers plus central locking, 
alarms and tracking devices. If better vehicle security caused the drop in car theft 
then, following Blumstein and Rosenfeld’s line of reasoning, perhaps it reduced 
violence too: There would be fewer cars to trade for drugs and for dealers to drive 
around. There would be fewer stolen cars for use by potential drug-market customers, 
and fewer for use in drive-by shootings, robberies and other crimes. This expectation 
is consistent with the fact that the drop in vehicle theft preceded that of violence 
including homicide as shown in Figure 6a which shows police-recorded Uniform 
Crime Report (UCR) data from 1960 onwards. More generally, the tendency for 
crimes to be linked and for one crime to produce a multiplier effect that generates 
others has been termed a ‘Van Dijk chain’ (Felson and Clarke, 1998; 19).   
 If preventing car theft reduced violence including homicide, this fits with the 
keystone crime hypothesis.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 6a AND 6b ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 6a shows that the drop in car theft was accelerating to 2008. This may reflect 
the growth of in-car telemetry systems (such as General Motors’ OnStar) that are 
linked to a control center (Economist, 2009). Such devices have now been around for 
over a decade and allow vehicle engines to be slowed and remotely deactivated, so a 
car can be stopped and located even if the thief has the key. They might be expected 
to impact on car-jacking and key theft as a modus operandi, thereby reducing key-
theft burglaries as a bonus. Figure 6a appears to suggest that the continuing fall in car 
theft has diverged from the trend for violence. However, our preliminary analysis of 
the first and second differences (for brevity, not included here) suggests violence may 
be continuing to follow a similar pattern to car theft and that, if so, further falls in 
violence may be experienced in the US.  
 
When crime trends for the US are examined using the survey data of the National 
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) which is available since the 1970s, there are 
distinct patterns, shown in Figure 6b (which also includes UCR data on homicides).2 
Theft and burglary track each other and have been in steady decline since the early 
                                                 
2  NCVS property crime and violent crime data (including UCR data on murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter) from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict.htm accessed  19 July 2009. 
 
1980s. Serious violence (including homicide) tracks motor vehicle theft, increasing in 
the 1980s then falling sharply in the 1990s. Trends in homicide track those of motor 
vehicle theft even more closely. While much of the research on the US crime drop has 
focused on violence, there seems good reason to suggest that focusing on other crime 
types, particularly vehicle theft, may be rewarding. More generally, we suggest there 
is a need for further research to explore the relationship between securitization of 
various types and the crime drops experienced in the US and elsewhere.  
 
Conclusion 
This study presented a set of security hypotheses, then case studies for one crime type 
in two countries. Following this, the hypothesis was extended to incorporate an 
interlocking set of hypotheses within the framework of routine activity and 
opportunity theory. Routine activity theory provided what is probably the most 
convincing explanation, against expectations, for the coincidence between increasing 
crime levels and increasing levels of wealth and welfare in the second half of the 
twentieth century (Cohen and Felson, 1979). It is odd that it has been rarely drawn on 
as a starting point for looking at the equally unexpected falls in crime since the early 
1990s. In this context the security hypothesis is, we suggest, a promising one to 
pursue in efforts to explain the variations in upward and downward crime trajectory 
for different crimes and places. Across-the-board explanations or ones that generalise 
from single countries or single crime types, and which lack the flexibility to explain 
why some crimes go up while others go down, seem to us unlikely to be adequate. 
Further research on the crime drop should explore the following hypotheses: 
 
 that securitization reduces the number and suitability of targets for other crime 
types  
 that reductions in car theft (and, we suspect, burglary) disrupt the routine 
activities that facilitate other crimes including violence  
 that reduced criminal opportunities stifle the onset and truncate the duration of 
criminal careers 
 that key changes in routine activities, and in potential offenders’ perceptions 
of benefits and costs, have reduced crime 
 
There is a clear policy lesson to be harnessed from the crime drop. It is well-
established that properly-developed situational crime prevention can have a dramatic 
effect on crime. However, more concerted effort to incentivise prevention by 
manufacturers and businesses may prove a particularly fruitful policy line. It took 
years of concerted effort by consumer groups, victim advocates and others, car theft 
indices and a vision of the crime-free car (e.g. Southall and Ekblom, 1985), plus the 
threat or introduction of regulation, to nudge car manufacturers into better security. 
Once it became a competitive issue this security improved rapidly and appears to have 
become tremendously effective. In particular, the data presented here suggest that 
good quality electronic immobilisers became car theft’s killer technology. The recent 
levelling-off and small increases in violence in the US (which incidentally preceded 
the recession underway at completion of this paper) seem likely due to ‘iCrime’ 
(Roman and Chalfin, 2007) and the increased availability of valuable portable high-
risk electronic goods. Consider if manufacturers can be encouraged to ensure such 
goods, including but not limited to MP3 players, smart-phones, GPS-systems and 
laptops, can be remotely tracked and disabled if stolen. Consider if architects and 
urban planners can be encouraged to ensure public and private buildings and 
environments discourage crime. To date, efforts to encourage designing-out crime by 
manufacturers, businesses, planners, and designers more generally, have been partial 
and uncoordinated. Further policy effort to instil prevention into the design stages for 
property, services and other products and systems is likely to prove a cost-effective 
means of tackling crime and can be directly influenced by government policy-makers. 
Society has a major comparative advantage and better resources than even the more 
adaptive offenders, but needs to stay ahead of the curve. This may be the lesson of the 
crime drop.  
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Appendix Box 1: Extract from Vehicle Standard (Australian Design Rule 82/00) – 
Engine Immobilizers 2006 (Lloyd 2006). 
 
31. GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS 
31.5. It shall not be possible to permanently override an immobilizer. 
31.7.  An immobilizer shall be designed and built such that, when installed on a 
vehicle, according to the manufacturer's instructions, it cannot rapidly and without 
attracting attention be rendered ineffective or destroyed by…. It shall be difficult and 
time consuming to replace a major component assembly in order to bypass the 
immobilizer…. 
 
32. PARTICULAR SPECIFICATIONS 
32.1.1. An immobilizer shall be designed so as to prevent the operation of the vehicle 
under its own power by at least one of the following means: 
32.1.1.1. disable, in the case of after-market fitting, or vehicle equipped with diesel 
engine, at least two separate vehicle circuits that are needed for vehicle operation 
under its own power (e.g. starter motor, ignition, fuel supply etc.); 
32.1.1.2. interference by code of at least one control unit required for the operation of 
the vehicle… 
32.2. Operating reliability 
Operating reliability shall be achieved by suitable design of the immobilizer, account 
being taken of specific environmental conditions in  the vehicle…. 
32.4. Setting of the immobilizer 
32.4.1. The immobilizer must be set without supplementary action from the driver by 
at least one of the following means:  
 at rotation of the ignition key into the "0" position in the ignition lock and 
activation of a door; in addition, immobilizers which unset immediately 
before orduring the normal starting procedure of the vehicle are permitted 
to set on turning the ignition off. 
 a maximum of 5 minutes after removing the key from the ignition lock. 
32.5.  Unsetting 
32.5.1. Unsetting shall be achieved by using one or a combination of the following 
devices. Other devices with an equivalent level of security giving equivalent 
performance are permitted.  
32.5.1.1. A key pad for inputting an individually selectable code having at least 
10,000 variants. 
32.5.1.2. Electrical/electronic device, e.g. remote control, with at least 50,000 variants 
and shall incorporate rolling codes and/or have a minimum scan time of ten days, e.g. 
a maximum of 5,000 variants per 24 hours for 50,000 variants minimum. 
32.5.1.3. If unsetting can be achieved via a remote control, the immobilizer must 
return to the set condition within 5 minutes after unsetting if no supplementary action 
on the starter circuit has been undertaken.’ (Lloyd: 33-4) 
 
The standard also requires that immobilizers have to be tested and approved. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Entry method for attempted car theft, England and Wales 1995-2007 
Method 
1995 
(%) 
1997 
(%) 
1999 
(%) 
2001/2
(%) 
2002/3
(%) 
2003/4
(%) 
2004/5 
(%) 
2005/6
(%) 
2006/7
(%) 
Forced lock 76 80 68 61 66 61 67 64 61
Broke window 10 12 18 27 21 22 22 25 26
Other 8 5 11 4 9 14 8 7 6
Door unlocked 2 2 2 6 3 3 2 4 5
Used key 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1
Window open 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Where columns do not sum to 100 this is due to rounding.  
 
 
Table 2: Prevalence (%) of car security devices, BSC 2006-7 
 
 
Security device 
Percent of cars with various security types  
All cars Stolen 
cars 
Theft 
from 
Attempted 
theft 
Central locking 87.8 59.5 74.4 67.6 
Car alarm 62.9 41.2 41.3 46.5 
Window security etching 52.0 44.9 51.2 55.7 
Electronic immobilizer (only) 45.7 23.6 36.0 36.9 
Electronic and mechanical immobilizer 22.8 12.4 20.6 21.3 
Mechanical immobilizer 9.9 9.2 10.2 11.4 
Tracking device 3.4 0.8 3.4 3.1 
Note: Columns sum to more than 100 because vehicles often have more than one 
security device.  
 
 
Table 3: Protective effect of security devices, BSC 2006-7 
 
 
Security device 
Percent risk reduction effect 
Car 
Theft 
Theft 
from 
Attempts 
Tracking device 77.3 0.1 9.7 
Electronic immobilizer 48.4 21.3 19.3 
Electronic and mechanical immobilizer 45.8 9.7 6.6 
Car alarm 34.5 34.4 26.1 
Central locking 32.2 15.2 23.0 
Window security etching 13.8 1.6 -6.9 
Mechanical immobilizer 7.3 -3.0 -15.7 
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Figure 1: Motor vehicle theft in the United States, England and Wales, and Australia
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Figure 2: Prevalence of car security in England and Wales 1991-2006 (Source: BCS) 
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Figure 3: Vehicle theft in Australia 1997-2007 (Source: CARS) 
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Figure 4: Temporary and permanent car theft in England and Wales, 1995-2007 
(Source: BCS)  
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Figure 4: Temporary and permanent car theft in Australia, 2000-2007 (Source: 
CARS)  
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Figure 5a: Entry method for car theft in England and Wales 1995-2007 (Source: NCS) 
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Figure 5a: Entry method for car theft in Australia 2001-2007 (Sources: CARS 
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Figure 6a: United States 1960-2008 (Source: UCR) 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
In
de
x 
(1
97
6=
10
0)
Vehicle theft
Homicide
Violence
Theft
Burglary
 
Figure 6b: United States 1976-2005 (Source: NCVS plus UCR homicides) 
 
